AUTHOR’S NOTE

PART ONE CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS POSITIVE LEGISLATORS IN COMPARATIVE LAW

INTRODUCTION： HANS KELSEN，JUDICIAL REVIEW，AND THE NEGATIVE LEGISLATOR

CHAPTER 1 JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATION AND THE LEGISLATOR

Ⅰ. THE SYSTEMS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS

Ⅱ. CONTROL OF CONSTITUTIONALITY AND CONTROL OF CONVENTIONALITY

Ⅲ. THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS ON CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL REFORMS

Ⅳ. THE QUESTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS POSITIVE LEGISLATORS

CHAPTER 2 CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS’ INTERFERENCE WITH THE CONSTITUENT POWER

Ⅰ. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS’ RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES OF CONSTITUTIONAL RANK AND ENACTMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL RULES

Ⅱ. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS AND AMENDMENTS

Ⅲ. THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS’ADAPTATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMATE CHANGES TO THE CONSTITUTION

1. Adapting the Constitution on Matters of Fundamental Rights Guarantees

2. The Mutation of the Constitution on Institutional Matters

Ⅳ. THE PROBLEM OF ILLEGITIMATE MUTATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION

CHAPTER3 CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS’ INTERFERENCE WITH THE LEGISLATOR ON EXISTING LEGISLATION

Ⅰ. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS’ INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES IN HARMONY WITH THE CONSTITUTION

Ⅱ. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS COMPLEMENTING THE LEGISLATOR BY ADDING NEW RULES （AND NEW MEANING） TO AN EXISTING LEGISLATIVE PROVISION

Ⅲ. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS COMPLEMENTING LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS BY INTERFERING WITH THE TEMPORAL EFFECTS OF LEGISLATION

1. The Power of the Constitutional Court to Determine When Annulled Legislation Will Cease to Have Effects： Postponing the Effect of the Court’s Ruling

2. The Power ofthe Constitutional Court to Determine When Annulled Legislation Will Cease to Have Effects： Retroactive or Nonretroactive Effects of 1ts Own Decisions

A. The Possibility of Limiting the Retroactive Ex Tunc Effects Regarding Declarative Decisions

B. The Possibility of Retroactive Effects for Ex Nune Constitutive Decisions

3. The Power of Constitutional Courts to Revive Repealed Legislation

Ⅳ. THE DEFORMATION OF THE INTERPRETATIVE PRINCIPLE： CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS’ REFORMING OF STATUTES AND INTERPRETING THEM WITHOUT INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION

CHAPTER 4 CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS’ INTERFERENCE WITH THE LEGISLATOR REGARDING LEGISLATIVE OMISSIONS

Ⅰ. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS’ FILLING THE GAP OF ABSOLUTE LEGISLATIVE OMISSIONS

1. Direct Action against Absolute Legislative Omissions

2. The Protection of Fundamental Rights against Absolute Legislative Omissions by Means of Actions or Complaints for Their Protection

Ⅱ. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS’ FILLING THE GAP OF RELATIVE LEGISLATIVE OMISSIONS

1. Constitutional Courts and Equality Rights： Deciding on the Unconstitutionality of Statutes without Declaring Their Nullity

2. Constitutional Courts ’Issuing Nonbinding Directives to the Legislator

3. Constitutional Courts’ Issuing Binding Orders and Directives to the Legislator

Ⅲ. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS PROVISIONAL LEGISLATORS

CHAPTER 5 CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS LEGISLATORS ON MATTERS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

Ⅰ. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS CREATING THEIR OWN JUDICIAL REVIEW POWERS

1. The Judge-Made Law Regarding the Diffuse System of Judicial Review

2. The Extension of Judicial Review Powers to Ensure the Protection of Fundamental Rights

3. The Need for the Express Provision in the Constitution of Judicial Review Powers of the Constitutional Jurisdiction and Its Deviation

Ⅱ. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS CREATING PROCEDURAL RULES ON JUDICIAL REVIEW PROCESSES

FINAL REMARKS

PART TWO NATIONAL REPORTS

ARGENTINA： Alejandra Rodriguez Galan and Alfredo Mauricio Vitolo，Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators

Ⅰ. REDUCTION OF THE SCOPE OF THE POLITICAL QUESTIONS DOCTRINE

Ⅱ. RECOGNITION OF PROCEDURAL GUARANTEES IN THE ABSENCE OF LEGISLATION

Ⅲ. STANDING

Ⅳ. ACCION DECLARATIVA DE CERTEZA （DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS） AS A DIRECT FORM OF EXERCISE OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW

Ⅴ. SUA SPONTE CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW

Ⅵ. ERGA OMNES EFFECT OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Ⅶ. ACTIVIST JURISPRUDENCE

1. “Educating” Congress

2. Reconciling Internal Legislation with Human Rights Treaties by Means of Interpretation

3. Amending Political Will and Rewriting Statutes

Ⅷ. CONCLUSION

AUSTRALIA： Cheryl Saunders，Interpretation and Review

Ⅰ. FRAMEWORK

1. Authority for Review

2. Jurisdiction

3. Concrete Review

A. Advisory Opinions

B. Declarations of Incompatibility

4. Standing

Ⅱ. APPROACH

1. Phases

A. 1903-1920

B. 1920-1944

C. 1944-1981

D. 1981-1998

E. 1998 to the Present

2. Legalism and Realism

A. Legalism

B. Realism

C. Realistic Legalism

3. Interpretation and Change

A. An Instrument of Government

B. Relevance of the Framers

Ⅲ. SOURCES

1. Precedent

2. Extrinsic Materials

3. Foreign Law

4. International Law

BIBLIOGRAPHY

AUSTRIA： Konrad Lachmayer，Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators

Ⅰ. INTRODUCTION： CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN AUSTRIA

Ⅱ. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE JUDICIAL REVIEW METHOD APPLIED IN AUSTRIA

1. Introduction

2. Access to Constitutional Justice

Ⅲ. JUDICIAL QUESTIONS ON MATTERS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

1. Judicial Decisions on Judicial Review

2. Effects of Judicial Decisions on Constitutional Matters

Ⅳ. IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS AND DECISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

1. Developing the Contents of the Fundamental Principles of the Austrian Constitution

2. Concrete Guidelines for the Legislator

3. Creating Constitutional Systems

4. Principle of Equality

Ⅴ. CONCLUSION-OPENING UP CONSTITUTIONAL POTENTIALS AND VALUE-BASED JUDGMENTS

BELGIUM： Patricia Popelier，The Belgian Constitutional Court as Positive Legislator： In Search of a Balance Between Rights Protection and Respect for Acts of Parliament

INTRODUCTION

Ⅰ. THE IMPACT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT ON CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS

Ⅱ. LEGISLATIVE OMISSIONS IN THE CASE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

1. Some Examples

2. Two Examples

Ⅲ. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Ⅳ. CONSEQUENCES OF THE FINDING THAT A LEGISLATIVE LACUNA IS CONTRARY TO THE CONSTITUTION

CONCLUSIONS

BRAZIL： Thomas Bustamante and Evanilda de Godoi Bustamante，Constitutional Courts as Negative Legislators： The Brazilian Case

INTRODUCTORY CONSIDERATIONS

Ⅰ. THE DIFFUSE AND INCIDENTAL SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

Ⅱ. THE CONCENTRATED SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

1. Concentrated Constitutional Jurisdiction by Direct Actions

A. The Direct Action of Unconstitutionality

B. The Declaratory Action of Constitutionality

C. The Direct Action against Unconstitutional Omissions

D. The Claim against the Disrespect to a Fundamental Precept

2. Concentrated Constitutional Review by Concrete Claims

A. Mandado de Seguranca （When Used to Contest an Act within the Legislative Procedure）

B. The Writ of Injunction （Mandado de Injuncao）

C. Additive Decisions and the Writ of Injunction

Ⅲ. EFFECTS OF THE JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS

1. Inter Partes and Erga Omnes Decisions

2. Binding and Nonbinding Decisions

3. The Scope ofthe Binding Effects of the Decisions of the Court

4. Interpretative and Reductive Decisions by the Federal Supreme Court

5. The Temporal Effects of the Decisions on Constitutional Matters （on Direct Actions of Unconstitutionality）

6. The Temporal Effects of the Decisions on Constitutional Matters （on Diffuse Decisions on Constitutional Matters）

7. Constitutional Mutations

Ⅳ. CONCLUSION： THE IDEA OF THE NEGATIVE LEGISLATOR

CANADA： Kent Roach，The Canadian Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators

INTRODUCTION

Ⅰ. CANADA’S SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

1. Federalism and the Court as Negative Legislator

2. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms

3. Negative and Positive Rights

4. Charter Litigation

5. Reference Cases

6. Constitutional Remedies

7. Positive Alternatives to Judicial Invalidation： Reading In or Judicial Amendments to Legislation

8. Alternatives to Immediate Invalidation： Delayed Declarations of Invalidity and Reply Legislation

Summary

Ⅱ. CANADA’S EXPERIENCE WITH COURTS AS POSITIVE LEGISLATORS

1. Criminal Justice

2. National Security

3. Gay Rights

4. Aboriginal and Treaty Rights

5. Political Policy

6. Minority-Language Policy

7. Social and Economic Policy

8. Labor Policy

9. Health-Care Policy

CONCLUSION

COLOMBIA： German Alfonso Lopez Daza，Le juge constitutionnel colombien，legislateur-cadre positif： un gouvernement des juges

INTRODUCTION

Ⅰ. DYNAMISME DE LA COUR CONSTITUTIONNELLE COLOMBIENNE DANS SON ROLE DE PROTECTRICE DE LA CONSTITUTION DE 1991

Ⅱ. JUSTICE CONSTITUTIONNELLE VERSUS POUVOIR EXECUTIF-POUVOIR LEGISLATIF

Ⅲ. LA COUR CONSTITUTIONNELLE COLOMBIENNE-LEGISLATEUR CADRE POSITIF

1. Sentences mampulatrices

2. Sentence substitutive

3. Sentences interpretatives ou conditionnees

4. Sentence additive ou d’integration

5. Sentence de recommandation du legislateur

6. Les sentences-lois

7. Les sentences a effet differe

Ⅳ. CONSTRUCTION THEORIQUE DU CONCEPT“GOUVERNEMENT DES JUGES”

BIBLIOGRAPHIE

COLOMBIA： Sandra Morelli，The Colombian Constitutional Court：From Institutional Leadership to Conceptual Audacity

Ⅰ. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

Ⅱ. DISPLACEMENT IN COLOMBIA

1. What Is the Unconstitutional State of Affairs？

Ⅲ. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROL OF LAWS

1. Warning

2. The Control of the Constitutionality ofthe Acts Amending the Constitution

A. The Constitutional Control Limited to the Vices of Procedure

B. The Procedural Vices of the Law through Which a Constitutional Referendum Is Summoned

a. The Power ofthe Congress of the Republic to Amend the Law Presented at the Request of a Popular Initiative

b. The Violation of the Law of Benches （Bancadas）

COSTA RICA： Ruben Hernaandez Valle，The Normative Resolutions of the Constitutional Court

Ⅰ. TYPOLOGY OF FAVORABLE LEGAL REVIEW RESOLUTIONS

1. Favorable Exhortative Resolutions

2. Simple Unconstitutionality Resolutions

A. Simple Unconstitutionality Declaration of Partial Nature

B. Simple Unconstitutionality Declaration of Full Nature

3. Interpretative Resolutions

A. Unconstitutionality Due to Erroneous Interpretation or Misapplication of a Provision in a Specific Case

B. Unconstitutionality a Result of the Effects of the Challenged Text or Provision

4. Favorable Resolutions of Inapplicability

5. Normative Resolutions

A. Favorable Additive Resolutions

B. Favorable Substitutive Resolutions

Ⅱ. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF NORMATIVE RESOLUTIONS

1. The Justification of Normative Resolutions

2. Criticism of Regulatory Resolutions

Ⅲ. REGULATORY RESOLUTIONS AND THE LIMITS TO CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

CROATIA： Sanja Baric and Petar Bacic，Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators

Ⅰ. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA： COMPOSITION，COMPETENCES，AND PROCEEDINGS

1. Introduction

2. Composition and Terms of Duty

3. Competences of the Constitutional Court

4. Proceedings of the Constitutional Court

5. Abstract Review

6. Concrete Review

7. Effects of the Constitutional Court’s Decision

8. Constitutional Complaint

9. Other Competences

A. Jurisdictional Disputes

B. Impeachment of the President of the Republic

C. Supervision of the Constitutionality of Programs and Activities of Political Parties

D. Control of the Constitutionality and Legality of the Elections and the National Referendum and the Electoral Disputes

E. Constitutional Court Procedures of Appeal

F. Monitoring the Execution of Constitutionality and Legality，and Supervisory Control over Passing Regulations for Executing the Constitution，Laws，and Other Regulations

Ⅱ. JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW DECISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

1. Judicial Activism versus the Legislative Branch

2. Methodological Activism of the Constitutional Court - The Interpretation and Power of the Legal Argument

3. Procedural Activism - Precedence of Form over Content

4. Substantial Activism - Support for Democracy and Constitutional Rights

Ⅲ. CONCLUSIONS ON THE ACTIVISM OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

CZECH REPUBLIC： Zdenek Kuhn，Czech Constitutional Court as Positive Legislator？

Ⅰ. THE HISTORY AND THE POWERS OF THE CZECH CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

Ⅱ. CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLAINTS AGAINST DECISIONS OF GENERAL COURTS

Ⅲ. INTERPRETATIVE DECISIONS IN ABSTRACT CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW： “SOFT CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW”

Ⅳ. POSITIVE ASPECT OF NEGATIVE DECISIONS OF THE COURT

Ⅴ. UNCONSTITUTIONAL GAPS IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM：PROVIDING CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES OR JUDICIAL SUBSTITUTION FOR THE LEGISLATOR？

Ⅵ. THE CZECH CONSTITUTIONAL COURT ACTING OPENLY AS POSITIVE LEGISLATOR-CASES OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AMENDMENTS TO THE LAW

Ⅶ. COURT’S SELF-PERCEPTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

FRANCE： Bertrand Mathieu，Le Conseil constitutionnel “legislateur positif. ” Ou la question des interventions du juge constitutionnel francais dans l’exercise de la function legislative

Ⅰ. TITRE LIMINAIRE： ELEMENTS D’ANALYSES SUR LE CONTROLE DE CONSTITUTIONNALITE EN FRANCE

Ⅱ. LES INTERACTIONS ENTRE LA FONCTION JURIDICTIONNELLE DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL ET LA FONCTION LEGISLATIVE

1. Les principes cadres

2. De quelques modalites d’intervention mediates du Conseil constitutionnel

- Les incidences sur la fabrication de la loi

- Les incidences sur les revisions constitutionnelles

- La question de la separabilite des dispositions inconstitutionnelles

- Les consequences tirees de l’inconstitutionnalite relevee

- L’outil de la proportionnalite

Ⅲ. ANALYSE D’UNE MODALITE SPECIFIQUE D’INTERVENTION DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL： LES RESERVES D’INTERPRETATION

1. Elements de definition et champ d’application

2 Les destinataires des reserves d’interpretation

3. La portee des reserves d’inierpretation： essai de typologie

-L’exclusion d’une interpretation inconstitutionnelle： le postulat du respect de la Constitution par le legislateur

-L’argument de la maladresse du 1egislateur

-La tentation de la reecriture

-La modification du champ d’application de la loi

-La paralyse de 1’application de la loi

4. Elements statistiques sommaires

EN GUISE DE CONCLUSION

GERMANY： Ines Hartel，Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators

Ⅰ. JUDICIAL MEANS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

1. Civil Rights Injunctions

2. Direct Actions to Control the Constitutionality of Statutes

3. Direct Actions to Control the Constitutionality of Legislative Omissions

4. Ex Officio Powers of Constitutional Judges and of the Constitutional Court or Tribunals

5. Authority of the Supreme Court of Constitutional Courts to Remove and Take Over Cases from Lower Courts（Avocamiento）

Ⅱ. JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON JUDICIAL REVIEW

1. Constitutional Interpretation

2. Declaration of the Unconstitutional Character of Statutes（Declaration of Incompatibility）

3. Annulment （Complete or Partial） of Unconstitutional Statutes

4. Influencing the Constitution

5. Decisions Including Legislative Structures

6. Additive Decisions Reforming Legislation

7. Admonitory Decisions

8. Judicial Replacement of the Legislator

9. Judicial Replacement of the Government in Policy-Making Processes

Ⅲ. EFFECTS OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS

BELGIUM，FRANCE，GERMANY： Christian Behrendt，L’activite du juge constitutionnel comme legislateur-cadre positif

INTRODUCTION

Ⅰ. LA NOTION D’“INTERFERENCE”

Ⅱ. LA CLASSIFICATION DES INTERFERENCES

Ⅲ. L’IMPORTANCE QUANTITATIVE DES INTERFERENCES

1. L’importance des lignes directrices

2. L’importance des injonctions

Ⅳ. LE RECOURS A LA TECHNIQUE DES INTERFERENCES：UNE TENTATIVE D’EVALUATION

CONCLUSIONS

GREECE： Julia Iliopoulos-Strangas and Stylianos-loannis G.Koutnatzis，Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators

Ⅰ. THE SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

1. Judicial Organization

2. Control of Legislative and Executive Acts

A. Origins and Development of Judicial Review throughout Greece’s Constitutional History

B. Judicial Review under the Greek Constitution of 1975

A. Constitutional Basis ofJudicial Review

B. Substantive and Procedural Constitutional Claims

C. Primary Features ofJudicial Review

D. Means of Concentration of Review

E. The Proposal to Establish a Constitutional Court

F. Control of Conventionality

G. Control of Executive Acts

H. Control of Constitutional Amendments

Ⅱ. THE APPLICATION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

1. The Development of Constitutional Jurisprudence

A. The Greek Courts’ Deferential Tradition

B. Phases in the Judicial Implementation of the1975 Constitution

2. Positive Legislation through Constitutional Adjudication

A. Extension of Preferential Treatment in Equality Principle Cases

B. The Council of State’s Environmental Jurisprudence

A. Constitutional Entrenchment of the Current Status of Environmental Protection

B. The Principle of Sustainable Development

Ⅲ. FINAL REMARKS

HUNGARY，Lorant Csink，Jozsef Petretei，and Peter Tilk，Constitutional Court as Positive Legislator

Ⅰ. ANTECEDENTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION

Ⅱ. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

Ⅲ. THE LEGAL CHARACTER OF THE DECISIONS OF THE COURT

Ⅳ. THE MANIFESTATION OF POSITIVE LEGISLATION

1. Constitutional Requirement

2. Mosaic Annulment

3. Role of the Court in the Examination of Omissions

4. Interpretation of the Constitution

INDIA： Surya Deva，Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators： The Indian Experience

INTRODUCTION

Ⅰ. JUDICIAL REVIEW： CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION

1. Judicial Review： The Provisions

2. Judicial Review： The Interpretation

Ⅱ. JUDICIARY BECOMING THE LEGISLATOR： SOME EXAMPLES

1. Guidelines for Police Arrest and Detention： D K Basu v. State of West Bengal

2. Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace： Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan

3. Ragging Menace at Universities

CONCLUSION

ITALY： Giampaolo Parodi，The Italian Constitutional Court as Positive Legislator

BIBLIOGRAPHY

MEXICO： Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor，The Mexican Supreme Court as Positive Legislator

INTRODUCTION

Ⅰ. THE SUPREME COURT AS A CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

1. Brief Background

2. Constitutional Evolution

3. Powers

A. Constitutional Control

B. Other Jurisdiction and Powers

Ⅱ. THE SUPREME COURT AS A POSITIVE LEGISLATOR

1. Amparo Proceedings （Specific Effects）

2. Abstract Unconstitutionality Cause ofAction against General Norms （Laws and International Treaties） and Constitutional Controversies （Erga Omnes Effect）

3. Legislative Omissions

CONCLUSIONS

NETHERLANDS： Jerfi Uzman，Tom Barkhuysen，and Michiel L.van Em merik，The Dutch Supreme Court： A Reluctant Positive Legislator？

INTRODUCTION

Ⅰ. THE BAN ON JUDICIAL CONSTITUTIONALITY REVIEW AND ITS SCOPE

1. Article 120 of the Dutch Constitution

2. Summary

Ⅱ. ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

1. Introduction： Monism and Article 94 of the Constitution

2. “Eligible to Bind All Persons ” and Judicial Lawmaking

3. The Increasing Role of the European Convention in National Case Law

4. Concluding Remarks

Ⅲ. THE LAWMAKING ROLE OF THE COURTS

1. Introduction

2. Defining the Process of Lawmaking

3. The Case Law of the Supreme Court Concerning Its Lawmaking Role

A. The Dual Custody Case： Distinguishing Positive from Negative Lawmaking

B. The Dutch Citizenship Case： Avoiding Policy Decisions

C. The Spring Decisions： Judicial Activism or Prudent Lawmaking？

D. After the High-Water Mark： A Slow Retreat to Judicial Restraint

E. Toward a New Model： The 1999 Labour Expenses Deduction Judgment

F. The Exception to the Rule： European Union Law

4. Reactions of “La Doctrine ” after 1999

Ⅳ. MEANS AND EFFECTS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

1. Introduction

2. Procedures Available to Enforce Fundamental Rights Law

3. Remedies for Fundamental Rights Violations

4. Effects of Judgments

5. Mitigating the Temporal Effects of Judgments

6. Judicial Reforms

SUMMARY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

NORWAY： Eivind Smith，Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators

Ⅰ. ON THE ORIGINS OF THE NORWEGIAN SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

Ⅱ. ON THE CHARACTER OF THE NORWEGIAN SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

Ⅲ. THE SUPREME COURT OF NORWAY AS A POSITIVE LEGISLATOR？

POLAND： Marek Safjan，The Constitutional Courts as a Positive Legislator

Ⅰ. PRELIMINARY REMARKS

Ⅱ. WHAT IS THE FUNCTION OF THE COURT AS A POSITIVE LEGISLATOR？

Ⅲ. INDIRECT，POSITIVE IMPACT- EFFECTS OF NEGATIVE LEGISLATION

Ⅳ. DIRECT FORMS OF IMPACT EXERTED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS VERSUS NORMATIVE ACTS

1. Interpretation of the Constitution

2. Interpretation of Laws： Interpretative Rulings

3. Signalization

CONCLUSIONS

PORTUGAL： Joaquim de Sousa Ribeiro and Esperanca Mealha，Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators

Ⅰ. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE JUDICIAL REVIEW METHOD APPLIED IN PORTUGAL

1. The Preemptive Control

2. The Abstract Review and the Concrete Review of Legislation

3. The Enforceability and Implementation of Decisions of the Constitutional Court

Ⅱ. POWERS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

1. Portuguese Constitutional Court as a Negative Legislator

2. Powers of the Court and Effects of Constitutional Review Decisions

3. Interpretation of Statute in Harmony with the Constitution

4. Manipulative and Additive Decisions

5. The Impact of Constitutional Case Law

SERBIA： Bosko Tripkovic，A Constitutional Court in Transition：Making Sense of Constitutional Adjudication in Postauthoritarian Serbia

INTRODUCTION

Ⅰ. NORMATIVE GOALS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

Ⅱ. PERFORMANCE OF THE SERBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

1. General Features of the System ofJudicial Review

2. Constitutional Adjudication and Democratic Process

A. Representation

B. Deliberation

3. Constitutional Court and Liberal Values

A. Direct Protection of Liberal Values

B. Indirect Protection of Liberal Values

CONCLUSION

SLOVAK REPUBLIC： Jan Svak and Lucia Berdisova，Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic as Positive Legislator via Application and Interpretation of the Constitution

Ⅰ. INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

Ⅱ. ABSTRACT CONTROL OF CONSTITUTIONALITY

1. Effect of the Ruling of the Constitutional Court regarding the Unconformity Between Legal Regulations

Ⅲ. CONCRETE CONTROL OF CONSTITUTIONALITY

SWITZERLAND： Tobias Jaag，Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators

Ⅰ. INTRODUCTION

1. Courts as Legislators in General

2. The Federal Supreme Court as a Constitutional Court

A Judicial Review in General

B. Limitations on Judicial Review

3. The Federal Supreme Court as Legislator

A. Negative Legislation

B. Positive Legislation

4. Federal and Cantonal Law

Ⅱ. REFUSAL OF THE FEDERAL SUPREME COURT TO ACT AS POSITIVE LEGISLATOR

1. Principle

2. Examples

Ⅲ. THE FEDERAL SUPREME COURT AS POSITIVE LEGISLATOR

1. In General

2. Fundamental Rights

A. New Fundamental Rights

B. Interpretation and Substantiation of Fundamental Rights

3. Political Rights

4. Procedural Guarantees

5. Federal Conflicts

6. Compensation for Infringement of Property Rights

7. Further Examples

CONCLUSIONS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ABBREVIATIONS

UNITED KINGDOM： John Bell，Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators

INTRODUCTION AND TERMINOLOGY

Ⅰ. CONSTITUTIONAL （JUDICIAL） REVIEW，CONCENTRATED OR DISTRIBUTED

Ⅱ. SPECIFIC ISSUES

1. Constitutional Review Procedures

2. Judicial Decisions

A. Human Rights and Judicial Activism

B. Judicial Substitution

3. Effect of Decisions

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA： Laurence Claus and Richard S.Kay，Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators in the United States

Ⅰ. LEGISLATORS AND POSITIVE LEGISLATORS

Ⅱ. HOW AMERICAN COURTS LEGISLATE THROUGH CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION

Ⅲ. ENFORCING JUDICIAL LEGISLATION

VENEZUELA： Daniela Urosa Maggi，Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators： The Venezuelan Experience

Ⅰ. THE NORMATIVE JURISDICTION ACCORDING TO THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER

Ⅱ. CASES WHERE THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER HAS EXTENDED ITS OWN COMPETENCIES THROUGH THE PRACTICING OF THE NORMATIVE JURISDICTION

1. Competencies in Constitutional Amparo Matters

A. Modification of the Competencies to Hear the Amparo Claims

B. Modification of the Procedure of the Constitutional Amparo Claim

2. Competencies in the Special Recourse to Review Decisions

3. Competencies to Hear the Interpretation of the Constitution Recourse

4. Competencies in Matters of Concentrated Control of the Constitutionality of Statutes and Other Acts Having Rank of Law

A. Jurisprudential Inclusion of the Competency of Incidental Control over Statutes

B. Modification of the Procedure of the Nullity Cases

5. Competencies in Matters of Control over Unconstitutionality for Omission

6. Competency in Matters of Claims for Protection of Diffuse and Collective Interests

A. Creation of a Claim for Protection of Diffuse and Collective Interests

B. Procedure to Be Followed and Legitimacy in Claims for Protection of Diffuse and Collective Interests

7. Competencies in Mattes of Habeas Data

Ⅲ. CASES OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON MATTERS OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION： THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER AS POSITIVE CONSTITUENT

1. Decisions No. 6 ofJanuary 27，2000 （case Milagros Gomez et al） and No. 180 of March 28，2000 （case Allan Brewer-Cariaset al）： Legitimization of the Constitutional Transition Regime Approved by the National Constituent Assembly on December 1999 and Legitimization of the Acts Performed by Such Assembly in the Execution of Such Transition RegimE.

2. Decision No. 34 of January 26，2004 （case Vestalia Araujo）：Interpretation of Article 203 of the Constitution

3. Decision No. 565 ofApril 15，2008 （case Attorney General of the Republic）： Interpretation ofArticle 164.10，of the 1999 Constitution

Ⅳ. PRECEDENTS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER IN WHICH IT ACTED AS POSITIVE LEGISLATOR FOR ADDING TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM REGULATORY PRINCIPLES THAT DID NOT EXIST BEFORE

1. Decision No. 1013 ofJune 12，2001 （case Elias Santana）：Interpretation and Limitation of Rights Related to Freedom of Expression and Right to Rebuttal

2. Decision No. 978 ofApril 30，2003 （case Bolivar Banco）：Resolution of the Method and Opportunity for Exercising the State Tax Authority on Tax Stamp Matters Pending the Issuing of the Relevant National Legislation

3. Decision No. 511 ofApril5，2004 （case Maira Rincon Lugo）：Decision on the Taking over Proceeding of Cases from Lower Courts （Avocamiento），Having Binding Nature for All Other Courts of the Supreme Tribunal ofJustice

4. Decision No. 1682 ofJuly 15，2005 （case Carmela Manpieri）：Interpretation of Article 77 of the Constitution - Comparison between Men and Women De Facto and Men and Women Marriage - and the Praetorian Development ofIts Legal Regime

5. Decision No. 1456 ofJuly 27，2006 （case Yamilex Nunez de Godoy） and the Praetorian Development of the Legal Regime of Assisted Reproduction

Ⅴ. PRECEDENTS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT THAT ACTS AS POSITIVE LEGISLATOR TO MODIFY PREEXISTING LAWS

1. Decisions That Modify Legal Rules through SubstitutiveDecisions on No Prior Declaration of Annulment of the Rule

A. Decision No. 2855 of November 20，2002 （case FEDENAGA）： Constitutionality of Articles 40 and 43 of the Decree with Force of Law on Rural Lands and Agrarian Development

B. Decision No. 2560 of August 5，2005 （case Romulo Pacheco）： Modification of Article 172 of the Organic Code of Criminal Procedure

C. Decision No. 301 of February 27，2007 （case Adriana Vigilanza）： Modification of the Sense and Scope of Article 31 of the Income Tax Law

2. Decisions of the Constitutional Chamber That Annulled and Established the New Wording of Legal Provisions

A. Decision no. 80 of February 1，2001 （Case of Procedural Terms）： Modification of Article 197 of the Civil Procedure Code Regarding the Calculation of Procedural Terms

B. Decision No. 1264 of June 11，2002 （case Jesus Rendon）：Partial Annulment of Article 201 of the Civil Procedure Code That Governs Judicial Holidays

C. Decision No. 2241 of September 24，2002 （case Andres Velazquez）： Partial Annulment of Article 80 of the Organic Law on the Financial Administration of the Public Sector

D. Decision No. 3241 of December 12，2002 （case COVEIN）： Partial Annulment of Article 1 of the Ordinance on the Industry and Commerce License Tax of the Bolivar Municipality of the Anzoategui State

E. Decision No. 865 of April 22，2003 （case Ernesto Jose Rodriguez Casares）： Annulment of Article 48 of the Ordinance on Urban and Rural Common and Personal Lands for the Bolivar District of the Zulia State

F. Decision No. 1104 of May 23，2006 （case Carlos Brender）： Partial Annulment of Article 90 of the Organic Law of the Attorney General of the Republic

G. Decision No. 163 of February 28，2008 （case Ciro Ramon Aratjo）： Partial Annulment of the Organic Law of Public Detcnse

a. Partial Annulment and Modification of the Text of Article 3 of the Organic Law of Public Defense

b Partial Annulment and Modification of Articles 11，12，and 13 of the Organic Law of Public Defense

c. Partial Annulment and Modification of Article 15 of the Organic Law of Public Defense

Ⅵ BRIEF CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE EXERCISE OF THE NORMATIVE POWERS BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME CHAMBER OF JUSTICE

PART THREE SYNTHESIS REPORT： CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS POSITIVE LEGISLATORS IN COMPARATIVE LAW

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

1. The Subordination of Constitutional Courts to the Constitution

2. New Role of Constitutional Courts and the Question of Acting as Positive Legislators

FIRST TREND： CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS INTERFERING WITH THE CONSTITUENT POWER

1. Constitutional Courts Resolving Constitutional Federal Disputes and Enacting Constitutional Rules

2. Constitutional Courts Exercising Judicial Review on Constitutional Provisions

3. Constitutional Courts Exercising Judicial Review on Constitutional Reforms and Amendments

4. The Role of Constitutional Courts Adapting the Constitution on Matters of Fundamental Rights

5. The Mutation of the Constitution on Institutional Matters

SECOND TREND： CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS INTERFERING WITH EXISTING LEGISLATION

1. Constitutional Courts Complementing Legislative Functions by Interpreting Statutes in Harmony with the Constitution

2. Constitutional Courts Complementing the Legislator byAdding New Rules （and a New Meaning） to the Existing Legislative Provision

3. Constitutional Courts Complementing Legislative Functions by Interfering with the Temporal Effects of Legislation

A. The Power of the Constitutional Courts to Determine When Annulled Legislation Will Cease to Have Effect：Postponing the Etfect of the Courts’ Ruling

B. The Power of the Constitutional Courts to Determine When Annulled Legislation Will Cease to Have Effects：The Retroactive or Nonretroactive Effects of Their Own Decisions

A. The Possibility of Limiting the Retroactive Ex Tunc Effects of Declarative Decisions

B. The Possibility of Retroactive Effects for Ex Nunc Constitutive Decisions

4. The Power of Constitutional Courts to Revive Repealed Legislation

THIRD TREND： CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS INTERFERING WITH THE ABSENCE OF LEGISLATION OR WITH LEGISLATIVE OMISSIONS

1. Constitutional Courts Filling In Absolute Legislative Omissions

A. The Direct Action against Absolute Legislative Omissions

B. The Protection of Fundamental Rights from Absolute Legislative Omissions by Means of Actions or Complaints for Their Protection

2. Constitutional Courts Filling In the Gap of Relative Legislative Omissions

A. Constitutional Courts’ Issuing of Nonbinding Directives to the Legislator

B. Constitutional Courts’ Issuing of Binding Orders and Directives to the Legislator

3. Constitutional Courts as Provisional Legislators

FOURTH TREND： CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS LEGISLATORS ON MATTERS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

1. Constitutional Courts’ Creating of Their Own Judicial Review Powers

A. The Judge-Made Law on the Diffuse System of Judicial Review

B. The Extension of Judicial Review Powers to Ensure the Protection of Fundamental Rights

2. The Need for the Express Provision in the Constitution of Judicial Review Powers of the Constitutional Jurisdiction and Its Deviation

3. Constitutional Courts ’Creation of Procedural Rules on Judicial Review

FINAL REMARKS

APPENDIX

INDEX