Introduction

Rawls' Law of Peoples

The argument

Aims

Structure

Part I

1 The Cosmopolitan Critique

Rawls' 'Libertarian turn'

A flawed Law of Peoples?

Peoples, not persons

The rejection of global redistribution

Rereading Rawls

2 Elucidating the ’Libertarian' Law of Peoples

Four reasons why

Fraternity

Reciprocity

Rawls' political constructivism

The principle of redress

The social minimum and its international analogue

Conclusion

3 A Duty with No Obligations?

Burdened societies

Self-determination

Political autonomy

A principle of transition

A mixed reception

Conclusion

PartⅡ

4 Considering the Capability Perspective

The justification of the duty

The duty of assistance as a pillar of international justice

The duty to burdened societies

The extent of the duty

Rawls' positive liberty?

Sen's idea of justice

Sen's critique of transcendental institutionalism

The capability critique

Rawlsian capabilities?

Conclusion

5 Conceptualizing State Capability: The Freedom of Peoples

Elaborating the international minimum

Beyond negative and positive

From two concepts to a triadic relation

Rawls' conception of freedom

Burdened societies' obstacles to freedom

Conclusion

6 Actualizing State Capability

Rawls' explanatory nationalism

Sen and Landes on development

The colonial legacy for political culture

A robust and rounded duty

State builders

System analysis

Conclusion

Part Ⅲ

7 A Duty in Equilibrium?

The foundations of a realistic utopia

Destabilizing assistance?

Intolerant advice?

Conclusion

8 Creeping Cosmopolitanism?

Converging with the cosmopolitans

Normative difference

Difference and toleration

A response to Sen

Toleration vs assistance

Conclusion

9 Conclusions

Notes

Bibliography

Index