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《ANTITRUST ECONOMICS AND LEGAL ANALYSIS,EUGENE M.SINGER,GRID PUBLISHING,INC,》__4

【书名】:《ANTITRUST ECONOMICS AND LEGAL ANALYSIS,EUGENE M.SINGER,GRID PUBLISHING,INC,》
【作者】:
【出版社】:
【时间】:
【页数】:226
【ISBN】:
【SS码】:40188953

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内容简介

1. ANTITRUST POLICY AND ECONOMIC MODELS

Classical Economic Models in Antitrust

The Inadequacies of the Model of Pure Competition for Antitrust Policy

Conclusion

Endnotes

Thought Questions

2. INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION

The Standard Industrial Classification Code (SIC)

Reclassification of Product Categories Over Time

Selection of a Sample of Industries

Concentration Trends

Selection of a Concentration Index

Conclusion

Endnotes

Thought Questions

3. PROFITS

Questions the Alleged Relationship Between Profits, Concentration and Monopoly Power

Inadequacies of Average Profit as a Performance Standard

The Statistical Significance of the Alleged Relationship Between Profits and Concentration

Conclusion

Endnotes

Thought Questions

4. INTRODUCTION TO ANTITRUST CASES

Monopoly

Price Fixing

Vertical Integration

Price Discrimination

Mergers

5. MONOPOLY CASES

The Standard Oil Case (1911)

Endnotes

Thought Questions

The Alcoa Case (1945)

United Shoe Machinery Case (1953)

Endnotes

Thought Questions

The Berkey Photo-Kodak Case (1978)

Thought Questions

The FTC ReaLemon Opinion (1978)

Endnotes

Thought Questions

The Memorex-IBM Case (1978)

Endnotes

Thought Questions

6. PRICE FIXING CASES

Introduction on Proof of Conspiracy

Direct Price Fixing Agreements

Price Reporting Plans

Endnotes

Thought Questions

7. VERTICAL INTEGRATION CASES

The Foreclosure of Suppliers

The "Squeezing" of Independent Fabricators

The Squeezing Dilemma

The Total Squeeze

Business Reciprocity

Territorial Restrictions on Dealers

Endnotes

Thought Questions

8. TYING ARRANGEMENTS

Economic Rationale for Tying Arrangement

The Per Se Rule for Tying Arrangements

Endnotes

9. ROBINSON-PATMAN CASES

Price Discrimination Under Section 2 (a)

The Meeting Competition Defense Under Section 2 (b)

Knowingly Inducing and Receiving Discriminatory Prices Under Section 2 (f)

Endnotes

Thought Questions

10. MERGER CASES

A. Determination of the Relevant Market

Endnotes

Thought Questions

B. Relative Concentration in Merger Cases

Endnotes

Thought Questions

C. Conglomerate Mergers

Endnotes

Thought Questions

D. Product Extension Mergers

Thought Questions

E. Horizontal Mergers Between A Leading Company and a Weak Competitor

Conclusion

Thought Questions

APPENDICES

A: Antitrust Law of the United States

B: Theoretical Comparison of the Models of Pure Competition and Pure Monopoly

C: Oligopoly Models

D: Economic Theory of Vertical Integration

E: Some Thoughts on the Calculation of Treble Damages

INDEX BY SUBJECT


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