Chapter 1 The Nature and Importance of Open-Ended Funds

1．The Nature of Open-Ended Funds

1.1 The Nature of Open-Ended Funds in the UK

1.2 The Nature of Open-Ended Funds in the USA

1.3 The Nature of Open-Ended Funds in China

2．The Importance of Open-Ended Funds in the Modern World

Chapter 2 Conflicts of Interest

1．The Nature of Conflicts of Interest within Open-Ended Funds

1.1 Divergence of Interest in Corporate Governance

1.2 Market Behaviours Tainted by Conflicts of Interest in the Financial Markets

2．Possible Remedies

2.1 Enhanced Corporate Governance

2.2 Enhanced External Supervision

Chapter 3 Regulation of Open-Ended Funds in the UK

1．Internal Corporate Governance in the UK

1.1 Fiduciary Duty Imposed by Case Law

1.2 General Duties of Trustees Imposed by Statutes

1.3 Chinese Wall

1.4 Separation of Business

1.5 General Meeting of Fund Holders

1.6 Disclosure

2．External Supervision in the UK

2.1 The Limitation of Objects of Open-Ended Funds'Investment

2.2 Market Abuse

2.3 Regulator

Chapter 4 Regulation of Conflicts of Interest in the USA

1．The Board of Directors

1.1 Election of Directors

1.2 Independent Directors

2．Fiduciary Duties

2.1 Fiduciary Duties under Section 36 of the Investment Company Act 1940

2.2 Lack of Guidance

2.3 Cases Corresponding to Section 36

3．Restrictions of Affiliated Transactions

3.1 Who Are Affiliated Persons of A Registered Investment Company?

3.2 Affiliate Transactions with Affiliated Persons Themselves

3.3 Joint Transactions with Affiliated Persons

3.4 Brokerage or Agency Transactions with Affiliated Persons

3.5 Underwriting by Affiliated Persons

4．Regulation of Insider Trading(Personal Trading)

4.1 The Definition of Insider(Access Person)

4.2 Regulation of Personal Trading

4.3 Report Insiders'Personal Securities Holdings and Transactions

4.4 Review of Reports

4.5 Pre-Clearance of Investment in IPOs and Limited Offerings

4.6 Recordkeeping and Public Disclosure

4.7 The SEC's Action

Chapter 5 Internal Corporate Governance of Open-Ended Funds in China and Proposals for Reform

1．Ownership Structure

1.1 Drawbacks of the Existing Ownership Structure

1.2 Should Banks,Securities Companies or Trust Companies Be the Holding Shareholders of the Fund Management Company?

1.3 Which Type of Ownership Structure Is Better for An Efficient and Reliable Legal Form of open-Ended Fund in China,Ownership Concentration or Ownership Dispersion?

1.4 Conclusion

2．Independent Directors

2.1 Ratio of Independent Directors

2.2 Reviewing the Management Fees

2.3 Reviewing the Affiliate Transactions

3．Chinese Wall

4．Affiliate Transactions

4.1 The Definition of Affiliated Persons

4.2 Restrictions on Affiliate Transactions

5．Legal Remedies

5.1 Fund Holder's Direct Action

5.2 Fund Holder's Derivative Action

5.3 The Function of the General Meeting of the Fund Holders

Chapter 6 External Supervision of Open-Ended Funds in China and Proposals for Reform

1．The Limitation of Objects of Open-Ended Funds'Investment

1.1 Limitations on the Types of Investment Objects

1.2 Limitations on the Proportion of Investment

1.3 Proposal for Limitation on the Amount of Investment Capital of Open-Ended Funds

2．Market Abuse

2.1 Insider Dealing

2.2 Divulging Inside Information

2.3 Counseling Others to Purchase or Sell Securities

2.4 Market Manipulation

2.5 Liabilities

2.6 Other Market Abusive Measures Such as Herding

3．Regulator

3.1 Investigation by the CSRC

3.2 A Brief Image of the Regulator in the Future

Chapter 7 Conclusion

Bibliography

Acknowledgements